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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 940610-CA

RANDALL PUGMIRE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

original

appellate

jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 782a-3(2)(f) (1994 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The first issue is whether Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2)
as defined by Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1988),
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case.
In reviewing a legislative enactment, the Court presumes
that it is constitutional.

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake,

169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (Utah 1991); Provo City Corp. v. State,
795 P.2d

1120, 1125

(Utah 1990).

The

void-for-vagueness

doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an,
. offense with sufficient definitiveness that
ordinary

people

can understand

what

conduct

is

prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983), Greenwood v. North
Salt Lake, supra.

"It is a basic principle of due process that

an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined."
(1972).

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108

The issue of vagueness was preserved at the trial court

set forth in the Defendants trial memorandum (R. 30-33).
The second issue is that there is insufficient evidence to
prove that the knife seized from the Defendant was a dangerous
weapon and that the Defendant had the requisite intent to commit
the crime.

On appeal, the appellate court will reverse a

criminal conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence

is so inclusive or so inherently

improbable that

"reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that
the Defendant committed the crime.

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,

84 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah
1983); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence was preserved
at the trial court level (R. 30-33, 74 at 82-86).
STATUTES RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
There are several statutes which are important in the
consideration of the issues on appeal in this case.

The

Defendant was charged with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2) (1953 as Amended).

That statute is

as follows:
(a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a
felony may not have in his possession or under his
custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
2

this part*
(b)

Any person who violates this subsection is guilty

of a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon
is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is
guilty of a second degree felony.
The definition of a "dangerous weapon" is contained in Utah
Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (c) (1953 as Amended):
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner
of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury.

The following factors shall

be used in determining whether an item, object or thing
not

commonly

known

as

a dangerous weapon

is a

dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object,
or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
and
(iii) the manner of which the instrument, object,
or thing was used.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
1.

The Information was filed in this case on February 10,

1994 and charged the Defendant with four counts:
Count I:

Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol

and/or drugs, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1953 as Amended).
Count II: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a
3

Class

C Misdemeanor,

in violation

of Utah

Code

Annotated 41-6-44.20 (1953 as Amended).
Count

III:

Driving

on

Suspension,

a Class B

Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
41-2-136 (1953 as Amended).
Count IV:

Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a

Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (2).
R. 1-2.
2.

After a preliminary hearing on February 23, 1994, the

matter was bound over to the District Court on Counts I, II, and
IV.

Count III, Driving on Suspension was dismissed (R. 10, 15).
3.

The Defendant was arraigned in District Court on April

14, 1994.

The Defendant entered not-guilty pleas to the charges

(R. 26).
4.

The matter was tried to Judge Boyd L. Park, sitting

without a jury, on May 23, 1994.

After a presentation of the

evidence, Judge Park dismissed

Count I, Driving Under the

Influence

Based upon the Defendant's

(R. 34-35, 45-48).

admission, the court found the Defendant guilty of Open Container
in a Motor Vehicle, a Class B Misdemeanor.

The court also found

the Defendant guilty of Count IV, Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by a Restricted Person (R. 39-42).
5.

The Defendant was sentenced and a Judgment and Order of

Probation was entered on September 8, 1994.

On Count II, Open

Container, the Defendant was sentenced to the Utah County Jail
4

for a period of 90 days.

On Count III, Possession of a Dangerous

Weapon by a Restricted Person, the court sentenced the Defendant
to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years.
The court ordered that the two terms were to run concurrently.
Execution of the sentence was suspended and the Defendant was
placed on probation for a period of 36 months.

Part of the

Defendant's sentence included the Defendant serving 120 days in
the County Jail and the payment of various fines and assessments
(R. 51-52).
6.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 6, 1994 (R.

69-70).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant was found guilty on only two counts, Open
Container and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted
Person.

The Defendant does not contest the court's findings with

regard to the open container and therefore only the facts
relevant to the charge of possession a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person are set out herein.
1.

On February 8, 1994, Provo City Police Officers were

dispatched to the residence of the Defendant's ex-wife, Rexine
Esplin, where the Defendant was involved in an altercation with
Jerry Knight, Rexine1s boyfriend (R. 74, at 39-41).
2.

At the time the Defendant was searched by the officers

before being placed in the police car, Officer Grossgebauer
retrieved a knife from the Defendant.

The knife was described

by the officer as a "buckknife" that folded into the handle and
5

was approximately 4 inches in length (R. 74, at 44).

The knife

was not used or taken from the Defendant's pocket during the
altercation.
3.

The Defendant's testimony regarding the knife was

proffered.

The proffer was that the knife was a buckknife, four

inches in length, that folded back into the body of the knife (R.
74, at 85).
4.

The court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law ruled as follows with regard to the charge:
(1)

UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows:

"Any

person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated
at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not
have in his possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any
item that in the manner of its use or intended use is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

In

construing whether an item, object, or thing not
commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous
weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or
thing; the character of the wound produced, if any;
and the manner in which the instrument, object, or
thing was used are determinative."
(2)

The appellate courts of this state have not

directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket knife, nor
what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute
6
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four and one-half inches and the blade extending from
the knife when opened is three-quarters inches to four
inches, depending on the measurement from the rounded
handle to the tip of the blade.

This court is of the

opinion that this is the type of knife ordinarily
used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the
throat,

cleaning,

animals.

skinning

or dismembering

game

The blade of the knife is in a locked

position when fully opened.
(4)

The court concludes that this knife is not an

ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use of the
knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury and is a dangerous weapon under the provisions
of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a).
(5)

The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a

reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the Information:
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted
Person, a Third Degree Felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Appellate Courts have previously determined that
the statute in question is facially constitutional.
is

clear

that

the

definition

of

"dangerous

However, it
weapon"

is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case.
The characteristics of the knife found on the Defendant are
consistent with ordinary pocket knives and other household and
sporting utensils.

There are simply insufficient facts upon
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ARGUMENT
POINT I: AS A p p L I E D T Q TmE F A C T g Q F T H I g CRSE^ UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 76-10-503 (2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
x
definitioi I ui "dangerous weapon11 is unconstitutionally vague as
9

it does not give notice of the prohibited

behavior

with

sufficient specificity, as required by Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.

It is also the Defendant's contention that

the malleable nature of the definitional statute renders it an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the courts,
pursuant to Article 5, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
This

Court

reviews

a legislative

presumption that it is constitutional.

enactment with

the

State v. Archambeau, 820

P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Greenwood v. City of North Salt
Lake, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. State,
795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990).
As enunciated by the Utah Appellate Courts, the void-forvagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define
an:
Offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

In addition, the

Utah Appellate Courts have held that there is "the requirement
that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement."
574 (1974).

Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
As noted in State v. Archambeau, supra, "it is a

basic principle of due process that the enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."
10
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The Utah Court - : Appeals has ruled tha t Utah Code Annotated
11

76-10-503 (2), as defined by Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2)
(a) is facially constitutional.

See State v. Archambeau, supra.

The Defendant contends that the statutes, as applied to the facts
of this case are unconstitutional.

Prior to the Court's decision

in State v. Archambeau, supra, the Utah Appellate Courts had
determined that an unloaded firearm (that was capable of being
loaded and fired), was a "dangerous weapon" under the statute
(State

v.

Davis, 711

P.2d

232

(Utah

1985),

and

that a

screwdriver, used to commit an assault, could be construed as a
dangerous weapon (State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874 (Utah 1988).
In State v. Archambeau, supra, the Court was faced with an
examination of various knives, a blowgun and blow darts.

In

Archambeau, the Defendant's parole officers confiscated a 10inch knife, with a 5 and a half inch blade and a 10-inch bowie
knife with a 6-inch blade, a 48-inch blowgun and blow darts. Id.
As with this case, there was no evidence that the Defendant
Archambeau had used or was intending to use the items in a
dangerous manner.

Id.

The Court started its analysis by stating that items thought
to be dangerous weapons may be analyzed in two ways.

First,

"

'dangerous weapon1 means any item that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
harm."

Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501 (2) (a) (Supp. 1088).

Importantly, the Court noted that this definition suggests that
any

item

capable of creating harm is a dangerous weapon,

"including a hunting rifle, a butcher knife, or a knitting
12

needle."

Id*

However,
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more,

commonly
Defendant

was specifically put on notice by his parole officers
that they considered these items dangerous weapons and
that he was prohibited by law from possessing them
while on parole*

Defendant was, thus, on notice that

he was unlawfully in possession of dangerous weapons.
Section 76-10-503 (2), as defined by Section 76-10-501
(2) (a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the Defendant.
Id.
As contrasted with the facts in State v. Archebeau, supra,
the Defendant in this case was never told by law enforcement
officials or his probation officer that possession of the knife
was a violation of his probation or of the statutes set out
above.

The Court of Appeals went to great lengths in Archembeau

to point out that the knives and blowgun were previously
confiscated

as dangerous weapons by Archembeau's

probation

officer and returned to him only with the understanding that the
items would be released to a cousin and not to the Defendant.
The Defendant

in this case had no warning

or

guidelines

established for him.
As opposed to the two 10-inch knives and blowgun, the
Defendant in this case had possession of a knife measuring 4 and
7/8-inch handle and a 4 and 1/2-inch blade (R. 39-40).

Although

the Court in State v. Clevidence, 153 Ariz. 295, 736 P. 2d 379,
385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), held that a knife could be considered
a dangerous weapon, most courts would disagree.
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In California,

the possession of a "dirk or dagger" is prohibited by statute
under similar circumstances to those described by the Utah
statute by a restricted person.

In People v. Forrest,, 432 P.2d

374 (Cal. 1967), the court held that an oversized pocket knife,
not designed primarily for stabbing, was not, as a matter of law,
a "dirk or dagger."
1971).

See also, People v. Bain, 489 P.2d 564 (Cal.

The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Giltner, 537 P.2d

14 (Hawaii, 1975) held that a diver's knife consisting of a hard
rubber handle with a blade measuring slightly less than 6 and 1/2
inches in length , one edge being serrated for most of its
length and then curved convexley to the point, was not a
"dagger" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting a persons
from carrying a dagger concealed on his person.
In interpreting the Hawaii statute, the court noted that the
intent was to bring within the statute's ambit, instruments
closely associated with criminal activity whose sole design and
purpose is to inflect bodily injury or death on another human
being.

State v. Rackle, 523 P.2d 299 (Hawaii 1974).

The Oregon court in State v. Pruett, 586 P.2d 800 (Ore. App.
1978), rules that a "sportsman's knife" which had a 3 and 1/2inch blade which folded manually into handle but locked when in
a fully opened position was an "ordinary pocket knife" under any
construction which might reasonable be given a similar state.
The Nevada court in Bradvice v. State, 760 P.2d 139 (Nev.
1988), held that a knife which had a blade less than 2-inches
along the sharpened edge and whose total length of the opened
15

blade was 5 and 3/4-inches, although the blade would lock into
place, was not a "dagger" or "dirk" for purposes of statute
prohibiting

a concealed

possessions

of

dirk,

daggers or

dangerous knives.
The statute in this case does not define all knives as
dangerous weapons.

As noted by the decisions outlined above,

there are knives with such a length and shape that a reasonable
person would conclude that the same was an instrument designed
primarily for stabbing.

Courts have looked to the length of the

blade, the presence of a serrated edge and other
characteristics.

similar

In this case, none of the characteristics

relied upon by other courts are present.
The difficulty of determining what knives are acceptable
under Utah statutory scheme is almost impossible.
Archembeau, noted

that possession

of

The Court in

a butcher knife

is

acceptable.

However, a butcher's knife may have a blade of over

12-inches.

Knives are found as attachments to household tools

intended for uses such as cutting wire, insulation, glass and
other material.

Generic pocket knives are also sold for that

purpose.

Even closer to call are the category of "sportsmen's

knives."

Although a convicted felon is prohibited from hunting

with a gun, a felon is allowed to fish, trap, dive and accompany
relatives on rifle and gun hunts.

It cannot seriously be argued

that' a knife purchased for household chores, fishing and other
similar tasks could be considered a dangerous weapon without a
more explicit prohibition in the statute.
16

If the statute was

interpreted to reach knives in general because of an existence of
a sharp edge alone, the list of other household implements that
would fit the same criteria is endless.

The ban would then reach

everything from table utensils to automotive tools, knitting and
sewing equipment and general sporting equipment.
It is respectfully submitted that the relatively small size
of the knife in question, the numerous legitimate uses of such a
knife and the lack of any prior warning to the Defendant mandate
a finding that the relevant statutes are unconstitutionally vague
as applied to the Defendant.

Although a statute must have

reasonable breadth and flexibility, as applied to this case, the
statute does not convey "sufficiently definitive standards, to
put a reasonable person on notice of prohibited conduct."
Greyned v. City of Rockford# supra; In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,
1088 (Utah 1981); State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah
1981); State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979).
Although the question of whether a 10 or 12-inch blade with
a serrated edge may be easier, a folding 4 1/2-inch blade cannot
be singled out as somehow being inherently dangerous.
characteristics

Every

of the Defendant's knife is duplicated by

instruments and tools used and possessed by most citizens during
the course of regular chores and sporting activities.

Given the

close association of the Defendant's knife with other household
instruments, the Defendant's knife cannot be singled out as an
inherent "dangerous weapon."
The difficulty of determining the breadth of the Utah
17

statute is highlighted by the trial court's decision.

Judge Park

held that the knife in question was a "type of knife ordinarily
used by game hunters. . . ." (R. 39). Judge Park concluded that
the knife was not an ordinary pocket knife (R. 39). The question
is to asked is what relationship exists between the trial court's
finding and the verdict.
dive.

A felon is allowed to hunt, fish and

Additionally, he is allowed to accompany friends and

family on gun and rifle hunts.

A felon is clearly allowed to

clean game of all kinds and butcher meat.

Therefore, the use

found by the Court for the knife, namely game and hunting
related, are not purposes that are prohibited activities for
felons or persons on probation.
Additionally, judge Park's findings assume that if the knife
were only a normal pocket knife, there would be no crime.
However, there is no criteria to determine what an "ordinary
pocket knife" is.

Is a blade of three inches acceptable.

Does

it matter if the blade can be folded into the handle, if the
blade is serrated
position.

and whether the blade locks in an open

Can an ordinary pocket knife be stored in a scabbard

and does criminality attach if it is so carried.

Obviously, what

is a normal pocket knife is a matter that would differ among
individuals depending on their experience and training.

A person

who is comfortable in performing chores around the house and
participates in sporting and outdoor activities may select a
knife that can be used for all purposes.

Even a person who does

not hunt but camps may select a knife similar to the defendants
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that can be used to shave leaves from limbs, construct tent pegs,
cut rope and be useful in other camping tasks.

What is

"ordinary" is a function of the person's lifestyle and there was
absolutely

no

evidence

establishing

that

the

knife

was

inconsistent with the Defendant's regular and legal work and
pleasure enterprises.
Certainly as applied to the facts of this case, the statute
is vague and impossible to apply fairly.
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS
WEAPON.
This Court is obligated to reverse the conviction for
insufficient evidence when the evidence is so inconclusive or so
inherently

improbable

that

"reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained a reasonable doubt" that the Defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah App. 1990); State

v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
The only case which the Utah Appellate Court has had an
opportunity to review a conviction of possession of a dangerous
weapon that involved a knife was in State v. Archembeau, 820 P.2d
920 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).

As outlined above, Archembeau, had the

two 10-inch knives and blowgun confiscated by his probation
officer.

The knives and blowgun were returned to Archembeau on

the condition that they would be turned over to his cousin.
Additionally, the court had before it two 10-inch knives and a
blowgun and darts.

The court was presented with expert testimony
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regarding the damage that a blowgun dart can do to a human being.
In ruling on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, the
Court stated:
We agree with the State that there was ample evidence
to prove that Defendant's knives and blowgun are
objectively the type of instruments reasonable people
would assume were dangerous weapons, as they were
objectively the type of weapons which are capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury.

Furthermore,

according to the trial testimony of parole agents
present during the May, 1988 search of Defendant's
home, Defendant was told that his knives and
blowgun were being seized at that time because the
agents considered them restricted, dangerous weapons
Defendant was forbidden from possessing while on
parole.
In a footnote, the Court noted that the fact that the knives
and blowgun

"found

themselves back

in his

[the Defendant

Archembeau] possession seems to the Court [was] done at his own
risk.

He knew why they were taken and removed from him in the

first instance."

Id.

As contrasted with State v. Archembeau, the facts in this
case do not support the conviction.

As opposed to two 10-inch

knives, the Defendant in this case had one knife with a 4 1/2inch blade.

The knife did not have a serrated edge or other

indicia of a dagger whose purpose is to inflict injury on another
20

human being*

No lay or expert testimony was offered regarding

the difference between the knife found on the Defendant and
regular pocket knives or sporting or other household items.

The

trial court's conclusion that a knife with a 4 1/2-inch blade is
a dangerous weapon while a pocket knife and other similar items
are not was totally arbitrary.

In the court's findings, Judge

Park simply concluded without any basis that:
This court is of the opinion that this is the
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the
purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, skinning or
dismembering game animals

....

R. 39.
As noted in the previous point, Utah law does not prohibit a
"restricted

person"

from

fishing,

accompanying others on rifle hunts.

trapping,

diving

or

Further, Utah law does not

prohibit a "restricted person" from cleaning game.

Accordingly,

the finding of Judge Park is irrelevant to the question and
certainly

did not describe conduct that is prohibited by

"restricted persons."

The trial court made no findings that the

knife had peculiar traits or characteristics that made it a
dangerous weapon to be used against human beings.
Finally, there was no evidence that the Defendant had ever
been warned or cautioned with regard to the knife in question.
The Defendant simply had no knowledge or information that his
possession of a folding knife

was violative of the law.

Utah Code Annotated 76-2-101 (1983 as Amended) provides as
21

follows:
No person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and;
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
with criminal negligence, or with a mental state
otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, as the definition of the offense
requires

....

Utah Code Annotated 76-2-102 (1983 as Amended) then provide:
Every offense not involving strict liability shall
require

a culpable

mental

state,

and

when

the

definition of the offense does not specify a culpable
mental state, and the offense does not involve strict
liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility.

An

offense shall involve strict liability if the statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative
purpose

to

impose

criminal

responsibility

for

commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute
without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.
Even under the lowest category of intent, reckless is
described as:
Recklessly,

or

maliciously,

with

respect

circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and
22

to

unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exists
or the result will occur . . . .
Although intent to commit a crime may be found from
proof of facts from which the fact finder reasonably could
believe, there is no such basis in this case.
706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985).

State v. McClain,

The Defendant was not advised that

possession of the item in question or other similar instruments
could be a violation of the law.

The knife was not one that a

reasonable person would believe constituted a generic "dangerous
weapon."

Even the trial court only found that the knife could be

used in sporting activities and made no finding that the knife
was otherwise dangerous.

There is simply nothing in the evidence

from which intent of the Defendant to violate the law can be
extracted.

The evidence is simply insufficient to establish that

the knife in question is a dangerous weapon or that the Defendant
had the requisite intent to violate the law.
CONCLUSION
Although this Court has found that the statutes defining a
"dangerous weapon" are facially constitutional, the issues of the
statute's vagueness based upon the particular facts of a case has
remained open.

The knife found on the Defendant was a short

bladed knife that had a large number of legitimate purposes and
did not have the general characteristics of "daggers" such as
much longer blades, serrated edges and the like.

The Defendant

had never been cautioned or warned about possession of the knife
in question or other similar instruments.
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The evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to
sustain a finding that the knife in question was dangerous or
that the Defendant intended to violate the law.
Accordingly, the conviction of the Defendant for possessing
a dangerous weapon should be reversed.
DATED this

\L-

day of December, 1994.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
and VERDICT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400119

vs.

DATE May 27, 1994

RANDALL PUGMIRE
Defendant.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
CLERK: LHH

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 23, 1994. Deputy Utah County
Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was
present and represented by Mike Petro, Esq.
The defendant, in open court, waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench
trial. The plaintiff did not object.
The court accepted a stipulation of the parties regarding the testimony of witness Ron
Carlson, who was then excused.
The following witnesses were called by the plaintiff and sworn and testified, to-wit:
Jerry Knight, Rexine Esplin and Officer Weinmuller. The court received exhibit 1. The
plaintiff rested after which, the defendant moved the court to dismiss count 1: Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs. The plaintiff responded to the motion. The court granted
the motion and dismissed count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a Third
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Degree Felony. Mr. Petro was directed to prepare findings and conclusions consistent with
the court's granting of the motion to dismiss.
Regarding count 2: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor the
defendant admitted his guilt, and the court made a finding that the defendant was guilty of
Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor.
Regarding count 4 of the Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, the defendant advised the court that he would not
put on any testimony and admitted to the court that on or about February 8, 1994, in Utah
County, Utah, the defendant was on probation for a felony and had in his possession at that
time a knife. The defendant handed to the court a prepared Trial Memorandum Argument
and asked that the court receive the Trial Memorandum Argument with regard to count 4 of
the Information. The plaintiff requested a short time in which to respond and the court
received the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the
Information on May 26, 1994. The court being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following findings, conclusions and renders a verdict:
1.

UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows: "Any person who is on parole for a felony

or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any item that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In construing
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whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used
are determinative."
2.

The appellate courts of this state have not directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket

knife, nor what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute a dangerous weapon.
Counsel for the defendant has furnished the court with citations to cases in California,
Hawaii, Oregon and Nevada which have considered what constitutes an ordinary pocket knife
and what type of a knife would be considered a dangerous weapon or a dagger or a dirk for
purposes of the particular state's statute. The cases cited by defense counsel are somewhat
enlightening but not particularly helpful with regard to the Utah statute.
3.

A personal examination of the knife found on the defendant at the time of his arrest has

been made by the court. The parties agreed that the court could view the knife and the court
has taken the liberty of marking the knife as exhibit #6. The knife itself, in this court's
view, is not what one would consider an ordinary pocket knife. The knife is very large and
very heavy to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife that would ordinarily be carried in a
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110. It consists of a large and mostly metal handle
being four and seven-eighths inches in length and ranges in width from one and one-eighth
inches on one end of the handle to seven-eighths inches on the blade end of the handle. The
actual blade of the knife is a large heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches wide at its
3

widest point tapering to a point on the end of the blade. The blade is well sharpened and the
total length of the blade is four and one-half inches and the blade extending from the knife
when opened is three and three-quarters inches to four inches, depending on the measurement
from the rounded handle to the tip of the blade. This court is of the opinion that this is the
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning,
skinning or dismembering game animals. The blade of the knife is in a locked position when
fully opened.
4.

The court concludes that this knife is not an ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use

of the knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and is a dangerous weapon
under the provisions of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a).
5.

The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the

Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree
Felony.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 27th day of May, 1994.
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